Tuesday, July 16, 2013

Cuba y los misiles

Cuba Archive
10:16 AM (13 hours ago)

Ref. Breaking news today:  Panama Seizes North Korea-Flagged Ship for Weapons, NYT, and others.
Reports on Cuba's missiles tied to North Korea have long been in the news. See below selections from our files. A lot more has been reported in Cuban and other media on the close friendship between Cuba's and North Korea's leadership and military.
It's probably no coincidence that a high-level North Korea military delegation was just in Havana "to strengthen ties between the allies."

Maria C. Werlau
Executive Director
Cuba Archive - Truth and Memory Project
Tel. (973)701-0520


 Author:     Rowland Evans, Robert Novak
 Creators Syndicate Inc.
Section: OP/ED
Page: a11

On April 25, U.S. spy satellites discovered at least one and possibly "several" banned SS 20 missiles in Cuba, a chilling contradiction of post-Cold War superpower benevolence that is now under top-secret White House scrutiny   
Intelligence sources insist there is no ambiguity about the missile's presence in Cuba, one of the world's last Communist bastions, nor about its illegality. All SS 20s were banned by the 1988 INF Treaty, and all must be destroyed by May 31. Apart from that, the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement ending the 1962 Cuban missile crisis barred offensive missiles from Cuba -- any and all kinds.
Bush administration officials are trying to develop a plausible theory for what they view as audacious conduct by the Soviet military and Cuban President Fidel Castro. Few Soviet actions could stir the patriotic juices along the Potomac as quickly as the transfer of SS 20s to the Caribbean island dictatorship. That is partly why the news is being held top secret while President Bush considers a July summit with Mikhail Gorbachev and special aid for his crumbling country.
The only conceivable explanation would appear to be linked to a minor proviso in the INF treaty that permits what is called "museum piece display" of the SS 20, set up for viewing in unarmed deployment. But the treaty demands full Soviet government consultation with the United States before putting any weapon on public display. One U.S. official told us that there is absolutely nothing to substantiate the "museum piece" explanation.
This same little-known proviso was employed by the Soviets and Cubans when a treaty-banned SS 4 medium-range missile was anchored in Cuban soil near Havana last year over strong U.S. objection. Its transfer there angered the Bush administration.
When the Soviet Foreign Office earlier told the United States that Moscow wanted to send an SS 4 to Cuba for that purpose, the State Department protested. Despite the INF treaty, it said, even a missile for sightseers, capable of firing warheads against the United States, would damage relations   with the Soviets and generate a strong political backlash from American politicians, particularly conservative Republicans. The episode has never been widely publicized.
Then-Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze assured the United States in July that no SS 4 would be sent to Cuba. Six months later, in December, the Soviet General Staff surreptitiously shipped the missile to Cuba, and it was put in place as a "museum piece." Shevardnadze's position on this issue, and his quick put-down by the military, is believed here to have been one of the contributing factors in his resignation, when he warned of a coming Soviet dictatorship.
The discovery of the SS 20 is a far more dangerous matter for U.S.-Soviet relations. It comes at a time of apprehension here about the military's growing power within a Soviet system that seems destined to grind to a halt. Yet the latest CIA studies suggest that the huge country, riven by the divisive nationality issue, a bankrupt economy and the collapse of Gorbachev's reform programs, is still mass-producing strategic weapons, including mobile missiles, that dwarf anything being produced in the United States. Indeed, Congress is not likely to fund any mobile missiles in the coming year for a U.S. strategic force that still does not have even one of them.
Unreported elements of this surprising attention to military power have been noted in Cuba, along with the discovery of one or more SS 20s. A new signal intelligence (SIGINT) unit has been located both by on-the-ground observation and by spy-satellite photography near Havana. The military garrison surrounding the U.S. Navy's Guantanamo Bay Naval Station has been beefed up by the addition of several thousand new Cuban troops.
More ominous are intelligence findings that suggest Cuba, with Soviet backing, may be developing a nuclear reactor capable of producing weapons-grade fuel in a new facility near Cienfuegos, the same area in which the one or more outlawed SS 20s have been placed. The Soviets have long had a facility there suspected of handling nuclear warheads to arm their strategic nuclear submarines.

Sudden, inexplicable spasms are natural in the life of expiring organisms, including empires. The savagely split and dying Soviet system may be producing just such aberrations today.
But authoritative Bush administration officials are not likely to accept that as any final answer to Castro's missiles of April. They will soon be demanding a definitive response, and Gorbachev will be compelled to give it
Copyright 1991  The Washington Post
Record Number: 364232

US Department of State Daily Press Briefing #84:
Thursday, 5/20/91
Source:         State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler
Description:    12:05 PM, Washington, DC
Date:           May 20, 19915/20/91
Category:       Briefings
Region:         MidEast/North Africa, Eurasia, Caribbean, Subsaharan Africa, Europe, E/C Europe
Country:        Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey, Yugoslavia (former), Cuba, South Africa, Israel, Ethiopia, Greece
Subject:  Development/Relief Aid, State Department, Democratization, Military Affairs, Terrorism, United Nations
[Cuba:  Museum Display of Missles]
Q    Do you have any comment on reports of SS-20 missiles in Cuba?  And has this been discussed with the Soviets?
MS. TUTWILER:  Number One, we are not aware of any SS-20 missiles in Cuba.  As you all may remember, it was about a year ago that we did tell you that the Cubans have a static display of an inert Soviet SS-4 missile at a museum in Havana.
The Treaty of the Elimination of Shorter-Range and Intermediate-Range Missiles permits static displays of inert missiles provided there is advance notification.  The Soviet Union complied with the provisions.  The Soviets informed us of this static display.  We did talk about this.  It was almost a year ago from this podium.  It's an SS-4.
 Q    But you're sure that there are no SS-20s?
MS. TUTWILER:  We're as sure as we can be.


July 1991 (vol. 7, #5) 1601 N. Tucson Blvd. Suite 9, Tucson AZ 85716 c 1991 J Orient
Cuba. On April 25, US spy satellites discovered at least one banned SS-20 missile in Cuba. Possibly, this might be permitted under the proviso of the INF Treaty that permits a ``museum piece display'' of an unarmed SS-20, although the Treaty demands full consultation with the US before placing a weapon on display. Coincidentally, the ``museum'' happens to be located near a nuclear reactor capable of producing weapons-grade material (Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Washington Post 5/20/91).
This situation, especially when coupled with the Soviet refusal to provide a photograph of an SS-20 before the day the INF Treaty was signed, illustrates Senator Helms' doubts: (1) We don't know what we're looking for. (2) We don't know where to look for it. (3) If we find it, we don't know what we have found. (4) If we figure out what it is, we don't know what to do about it (Andrei Nazarov, Chronicles, June, 1991).

September 1991 (vol. 7, #6) 1601 N. Tucson Blvd. Suite 9, Tucson AZ 85716 c 1991 J Orient
The Silence Is Broken
· Soviets deliver SS-20 Intermediate Ballistic Missiles to Cuba with 3,000-mile range.
· USA delivers $1.5 billion in grain credits to the Soviets.
· Maine's American Legion votes to deliver 7-ton steel mobile civil defense shelter display.
· Politicians just remain silent.

March 1992
Vol. 49, No. 2

Third World Ballistic Missiles: Are the Facts Lost in the Numbers?
By Lora Lumpe, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David C. Wright
September 10, 1991


Cuba. Cuba received 50 km range Frog-4 missiles from the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s. Later, 70 km Frog-7s were transferred. The Cubans are thought to have a total of 65 launchers.(6) The short range of both systems renders them useful only for combat on the island or perhaps coastal defense. For the past 30 years Cuba has been almost completely reliant on Soviet military aid. It has no arms production base.
Lora Lumpe, a research analyst at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, D.C., is editor of the Arms Sales Monitor.
Lisbeth Gronlund, an SSRC-MacArthur fellow in international peace and security, is at the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland, in College Park.
David C. Wright is an analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington, D.C.

Defense White Paper, published by the Department of Defense in Washington DC
Chapter Three North Korean Situation and Military Threat

Practicing unprecedented diplomacy towards the West, North Korea has appealed to international organizations such as the World Food Program and to Western nations, and has invited delegates from Western governments to visit and see their situation more accurately. North Korea propagandizes to its people that the European Union's voluntary offer to provide the North with emergency support materials such as food and fertilizer in May 1998 was a result of such diplomatic efforts. In addition, since early 1998 the North has been sending delegates to conferences in Non-Aligned Movement countries, and has been increasing the number of high-level party, government and military officials' visits to India, Syria and Cuba. Such participation and visits have been made to expand exchanges, negotiate investments and appeal for economic aid. In the meantime, the North's negotiations with the Taiwan government to import nuclear wastes, for the purpose of acquiring hard currency, have been suspended due to mounting opposition from the international community.

This Week - ABC News
Sunday, October 5, 2003
Host: George Stephanopoulos

Excerpts of Transcript by ABC News
Did you have anything else in mind though, not discovering a void, but did you, what did you think might be a surprise?


You know, George, what I had in mind is I'm rarely gifted in having 1300 very bright and dedicated people who can use all of the technology that the US, the UK and the Australians can put there.  We're inside the country.  I know in that country we're going to find remarkable things about their weapons program.  I would contend we've already found things that if they had been known last December, January, February, you would have had headlines in all the papers who now pick on the sentence "not yet found weapons" trumpeting North Korean missiles going to Cuba, clandestine labs in the biological program.  There's a whole host of stuff we have found.

N. Korea Hints at Talks, but Defector Casts Doubts
Thursday, October 30, 2003

WASHINGTON — North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il (search) agreed Thursday to continue discussions on his country's continuing nuclear weapons program, but a defector from the communist country said the United States shouldn't count on Kim to keep his promises.
"He went ahead and broke his promises, and I believe the same thing will happen again, this time," said Hwang Jang Yop(search), an 81-year-old doctor and former secretary to North Korea's main decision-making body, the Central Committee.
Kim met Thursday with China's No. 2 leader and agreed in vague terms to continue multinational talks aimed at closing down his country's nuclear weapons program.
The Bush administration welcomed the announcement as "encouraging" and praised China for its involvement.
"The discussions that the Chinese leadership, Chinese leader Wu Bangguo, had in North Korea, does look like a step in the right direction," said State Department spokesman Richard Boucher.
As North Korea's highest-ranking defector, Hwang is well-versed in Kim's behavior as well as that of China.
"He believes that if China engages further, that what they will do is tell the North Koreans, 'We don't object to your having a nuclear capacity, but why don't you stop expanding it? Why don't you express interest in getting rid of what you've got, even if you're going to keep it, so that you can get aid from the West?'" said Rep. Chris Cox, R-Calif., who met Thursday with Hwang to discuss insights into the North Korean leader and his citizens' fears.

According to Hwang, Kim's repression of political dissent and use of mass-media brainwashing techniques exceed even those used in Nazi Germany. The regime has imprisoned at least 300,000 so-called "political offenders" in slave labor camps and often jails for life three generations of an offender's family.
"Even in the Soviet camp system ... there was no extension of guilt to members of the family," said author David Hawk, who documented one of the camp's activities for the Committee on Human Rights (search) for North Korea. Hawk and his organization said the prison camps are notable for their high number of unnatural deaths and for their gruesome treatment of prisoners.
But the Moscow-educated lawyer and former communist said Kim's iron grip is really limited to about 300 party officials and bureaucrats. About 80 to 90 percent of the country is desperate for regime change.
"He believes there could be a rapid collapse of the regime if conditions were right," Cox said.
The State Department said it is also interested in the information Hwang wants to share. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with Hwang Thursday, as have other State Department officials.
"These are discussions that we need to have in private," Boucher said. "I'll let [Armitage] describe his views, but we find it very interesting and useful to talk to somebody with firsthand experience. Obviously, it helps our thinking, and I'll leave it at that."
But, Boucher added, Hwang's insights will not have bearing on U.S. intentions regarding multi-party talks with North Korea.
Asked if the reclusive Kim, rumored to be an erratic alcoholic, is psychologically stable, Hwang refused to answer in public.
"Even though I may have information on that, I really would rather not discuss it," he said.
But one lawmaker said Hwang did offer his opinions of Kim privately.
"I think Mr. Hwang believes [Kim] is quite rational, quite cunning," said Rep. Jim Leach, R-Iowa.
Cox said Hwang, who left his family behind when he escaped to South Korea in 1997, also gave information on extensive and previously unknown exchanges of weapons and information between North Korea and another communist dictatorship closer to home: Cuba.
Fox News' James Rosen and Teri Schultz contributed to this report.


GIS Special Topical Studies
Iraq War 2003: Background & Lessons

Special Report

 December 12, 2002


Iran’s Military Nuclear Capability, Highlighted by Exclusive 1992 Report, Now Critical Part of Persian Gulf Strategic Planning
Analysis. Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, the companion journal to the Global Information System (GIS), in its February 1992 edition, carried an extensive report on the acquisition of former Soviet nuclear weapons. The report, by then Contributing Editor (now Senior Editor) Yossef Bodansky, relied on first-hand human intelligence sources of the highest level. The information was independently verified to Defense & Foreign Affairs by separate first-hand sources directly involved in the Iranian nuclear weapons program, and some clear documentary evidence was also shown at the time to Defense & Foreign Affairs chief Gregory Copley. The US State Department at the time went to some lengths to ridicule the reports, until strong Congressional pressure caused the State Department to issue a retraction of the comments it made.
The 5,300-word, February 1992 report, Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons And Moves To Provide Cover to Syria, is reproduced below.

Special Report

Iran’s Military Nuclear Capability, Highlighted by Exclusive 1992 Report, Now Critical Part of Persian Gulf Strategic Planning
Analysis. Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, the companion journal to the Global Information System (GIS), in its February 1992 edition, carried an extensive report on the acquisition of former Soviet nuclear weapons. The report, by then Contributing Editor (now Senior Editor) Yossef Bodansky, relied on first-hand human intelligence sources of the highest level. The information was independently verified to Defense & Foreign Affairs by separate first-hand sources directly involved in the Iranian nuclear weapons program, and some clear documentary evidence was also shown at the time to Defense & Foreign Affairs chief Gregory Copley. The US State Department at the time went to some lengths to ridicule the reports, until strong Congressional pressure caused the State Department to issue a retraction of the comments it made.
Now, substantial confirming data has become available, much of it published in Yossef Bodansky’s new book, The High Cost of Peace: How Washington’s Middle East Policy Left America Vulnerable to Terrorism.
Defense & Foreign Affairs also published several other reports on the Iranian nuclear weapons program and its ballistic missile programs. The October-November 1992 edition of Strategic Policy also included areport entitled Iran's Growth As a Gunpowder State Jeopardizes Its Domestic Unity. That report consisted of an interview with Dr Assad Homayoun, the last Imperial Iranian head of mission in Washington DC, and the head of Azadegan Foundation, an Iranian nationalist movement. Dr Homayoun is also still a Senior Fellow at the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), the parent organization of GIS and Defense & Foreign Affairs. That report is also reproduced below.
In his book, The High Cost of Peace, Bodansky outlines in even greater detail — based on accumulated intelligence collection — the Iranian process of nuclear weapons acquisition from the former Soviet Union, starting in 1991. In the book, he notes [pp76-77]: “


Bodansky’s book also outlines planning between Iran and its regional allies and the DPRK to jointly undertake a war against the West,originally predicating the conflict to start during the 1992 US Presidential election process, a time adjudged to be one in which US strategic decision making efficiency would be at its lowest.
Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons And Moves To Provide Cover to Syria
Iran is now in the final stage of assembling three nuclear weapons from parts provided from the former Soviet Muslim republics. Its indigenous nuclear program is also moving swiftly.

Contributing Editor Yossef Bodansky reports.

Delivery of nuclear weapons by aircraft is another matter, because it requires special maneuvers and specially-modified aircraft. This problem was solved in late September 1991, when Cuba and Iransignificantly upgraded their nuclear cooperation [see Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Winter 1991-92]. A high-level delegation led by Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart, the Soviet-trained head of Cuba's nuclear effort and Fidel Castro's son, visited Tehran and inspected several nuclear facilities, including the Bushehr plants. The delegates were received by Pres. Hashemi-Rafsanjani to discuss "topics related to bilateral cooperation and current affairs". At the end of the visit, Cuba and Iran signed a cooperation accord on nuclearissues.
Cuba's unique significance lies in the military expertise it has acquired from the USSR as part of the Soviet planning for operations in a possible nuclear world war. The USSR has maintained in the Cuba Armed Forces nuclear-capable delivery systems for a future war. Most important is a MiG-23BN (upgraded Flogger-F) regiment based in a closed part of the San Antonia de los Banos air base near Havana, and sheltered in an extensive net of tunnels in the mountains adjacent to the base. Gen. Rafael del Pino explained that these Floggers were "ready for nuclear delivery". [See also Strategic Policy, Winter 1991-92.] The September 1991 deal between Iran and Cuba involved the exchange of nuclear delivery techniques and technology for oil.

(Special Report: Iran’s Military Nuclear Capability, Highlighted by Exclusive 1992 Report, Now Critical Part of Persian Gulf Strategic Planning, Iraq War 2003: Background & Lessons, Global Information System, GIS Special Topical Studies,  December 12, 2002.http://www.strategicstudies.org/IraqWar03/Dec1202.htm.)

"It is possible that some 400 `Scud B' and `Scud C' variant missiles were exported by North Korea to Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Vietnam. However, there is no confirmation that Cuba, Egypt, Iraq or Libya received `Scud C' variants, and the numbers are difficult to determine..."
Source: Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems
`SCUD C' variant (Hwasong 6) Type
Intermediate-range, road mobile, liquid-propellant, single warhead ballistic missile.
It is believed that the development of the `Scud C' variant was started in North Korea by the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau in 1984, following on from the successful reverse engineering of the SS-1 `Scud B' missiles received from Egypt. The origins of the design for increasing the 300 km range of the `Scud B' to 550 km for the `Scud C' variant are not known, but could have come from earlier Russian designs or from the Chinese. It is interesting to compare the approach taken by the North Koreans with that taken two or three years later by Iraq. Whereas the Iraqi design was similar, in that the fuel and oxidant tanks were enlarged and the warhead weight decreased, the workmanship in the North Korean case was superior as they fully modernised the airframe using lighter steel skins. The Iraqi design, known as Al Hussein, increased the length of the basic `Scud B' airframe from 11.25 m to 12.46 m, by welding in a body plug from a cannibalised missile section. The North Korean variant retains the original `Scud B' 11.25 m length, but carries more fuel by redesigning the fuel and oxidant tank shapes. A reverse engineered Russian MAZ 543 Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle was also developed in North Korea, to carry both the 'Scud B' and 'Scud C' variants. A series of test launches was made between 1987 and 1990. The first reported full range launch test of the North Korean `Scud C' variant was in October 1991 and full-scale production started in 1992.
Unconfirmed reports in 1997 suggested that a longer-range version of the `Scud C' variant is being developed, with the payload reduced to 300 kg and the range increased to 800 km.
The `Scud C' variant developed by North Korea has a length of 11.25 m, a body diameter of 0.88 m and a launch weight of 6,400 kg. The payload is believed to be 770 kg, with a redesigned warhead assembly that can carry unitary HE, unitary chemical, biological, chemical submunition or HE submunition types. It is not known if the warhead assembly separates from the motor section after motor burnout, as in the Russian design. The fuel and oxidant tanks have been enlarged, with a total propellant weight believed to be 4,500 kg. The propellants are believed to be UDMH and IRFNA, and the total burn time is around 72 seconds. It is believed that the inertial guidance system from `Scud B' has been upgraded and that the `Scud C' variant has an accuracy of 700 to 1,000 m CEP. Control during the boost phase is carried out by graphite vanes in the motor exhaust. The minimum range is probably around 100 km and the maximum range is 550 km.
The North Koreans have several types of TEL vehicles in use, including the reverse engineered Russian MAZ 543 associated with the `Scud B' variant, MAN and Nissan converted tractor and trailer vehicles.
Operational status
Development of the `Scud C' variant (Hwasong 6) started in North Korea in 1984, and production started in 1991/92 at the former `Scud B' facility near Pyongyang, but was later transferred to a large underground facility at Kanggye in Chagang-Do province. It is believed that North Korea was producing from 50 to 100 `Scud B' and `Scud C' variant missiles per year during the late 1980s and early 1990s with several upgrades being incorporated in the later built missiles. Production has now been slowed and has probably ceased, except for specific export orders. Around 200 `Scud C' variant missiles are believed to be in service in North Korea with 50 TEL or fixed launch sites. These missiles are believed to be located at four main sites; Singye in Hwanghae-Pukto province, Sariwan in Hwanghae-Namdo province, Okpyang in Kangwon-Do province and at Chunggang in Chagang-Do province. Each missile regiment has four battalions, and each battalion has six TELs and around 175 men. It is possible that some 400 `Scud B' and `Scud C' variant missiles were exported by North Korea to Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Vietnam. However, there is no confirmation that Cuba, Egypt, Iraq or Libya received `Scud C' variants, and the numbers are difficult to determine as Iran and Syria are assembling missiles and have set up their own production lines. It is reported that 60 missiles were exported to Iran in 1991, and that Iran made a flight test in may 1991. Iran then started to assemble and test and eventually to build its own missiles, which are known as Shahab 2 missiles. Around 60 missiles and 12 TEL were exported to Syria starting from 1991, who then set up assembly and test and later production facilities with the help of Iran. Three missiles were tested in Syria between 1992 and 1994, and a further four missiles were tested in 1997. It is believed that 'Scud C' variant technologies were sold to Egypt and Libya. Flight tests of `Scud C' variant missiles have been made in both Iran and Syria from 1991 onwards. Vietnam is reported to have ordered some `Scud C' variant missiles from North Korea in 1998, and an offer was made to Sudan in 1999 to set up a manufacturing facility for 'Scud B' or 'Scud C' variant missiles probably in co-operation with Iran.

Castro Calls for Closer Ties with North Korea

Source: AFP, Feb 7, 2002 - "Castro congratulates Kim Jong-Il on 60th birthday"
Cuban dictator Fidel Castro congratulated his Axis of Evil counterpart Kim Jong Il on the occasion of the "Beloved Leader's" 60th birthday, and called for stronger ties between the communist nations, state media said Thursday.

In the birthday message received on Tuesday, Castro wished Kim "great success and good health and happiness," the North's official Korean Central News Agency said. "Your devoted efforts exerted to lead the struggle of the Korean people to foil the hostile acts of the imperialist powers and build socialism and the country earn our admiration and respect," Castro was quoted as saying.
"Availing myself of this significant occasion, I would like to reiterate our strong will to steadily expand and strengthen fraternal ties and cooperation between the peoples, parties and governments of the two countries," he said.
Kim turns 60 on February 16 and the anniversary is being marked as a major holiday by the Stalinist state.
Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, North Korea and Cuba are among the last believers in orthodox communism. Both countries are on the .
See Also: AFP, Feb 7, 2002 - "Castro congratulates Kim Jong-Il on 60th birthday."

 Raúl Castro se reúne con altos oficiales de Corea del Norte

La Habana, 27 nov 2004 (EFE).- El ministro de Defensa de Cuba y segundo hombre del régimen, Raúl Castro, se reunió hoy con el vicemariscal norcoreano Kim Yong Chun y otros miembros de la delegación militar que preside.
En un "ambiente amistoso que caracteriza las relaciones entre las fuerzas armadas de ambos países", según la prensa local, Raúl Castro, hermano menor del presidente Fidel Castro, junto a otros altos cargos militares cubanos y coreanos, hablaron sobre sus respectivos esfuerzos dirigidos a fortalecer la defensa nacional.
En la jornada de hoy se condecoró con la Orden de la Solidaridad al vicemariscal norcoreano, mientras que con la Medalla Fraternidad Combativa fueron galardonados el general de Ejército, Pak Zae Gyong; los coroneles generales Ri Yong Guil y Pak Sung Won, y el mayor general An Yong Gui.
El resto de los miembros de la comitiva militar norcoreana fue galardonado con la Distinción Servicio Distinguido del Ejército cubano.
La delegación de Corea del Norte llegó a La Habana el pasado martes, y poco después colocó una ofrenda floral en la tumba del general de las guerras cubanas de independencia, Antonio Maceo, y de su ayudante, el dominicano Panchito Gómez, y luego participó en una ceremonia militar en el Mausoleo, situado en el Cacahual, al oeste de la capital.
En esa ocasión los militares norcoreanos fueron acompañados por el general Alvaro López Miera, jefe del Estado Mayor General del Ejército cubano; el embajador norcoreano en la isla, Pak Tong Chun, y otros oficiales.
Kim Yong Chun y su delegación visitaron además una unidad militar de defensa antiaérea, donde fueron recibidos por el deneral de división Ermio Hernández, jefe del Estado Mayor Occidental.
Luego recorrieron una gran unidad blindada y visitaron la sede del Estado Mayor del Ejército Occidental en la capital y sostuvieron conversaciones oficiales con el jefe del Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas cubanas.

North Korean, Cuban Foreign Ministers Meet to Enhance Ties

177 words
10 September 2009
Yonhap English News

SEOUL (Yonhap) -- Foreign ministers of North Korea and Cuba met in Pyongyang on Sept. 4 to discuss ways to enhance bilateral ties, state media said. The North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun and his Cuban counterpart Bruno Rodriguez, during the talks, reconfirmed their governments' desire to keep developing friendly ties between the two countries, the North's Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS) said. The ministers also exchanged opinions on a series of issues of mutual interest, it added. Before the talks, North Korea's ceremonial head of state Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), and Choe Thae-bok, chairman of the SPA and secretary of the Workers' Party, met with Rodriguez at Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang, KCBS said. Jose Manuel Galego Montano, Cuban ambassador to North Korea, hosted a welcoming reception for the Cuban government delegation led by Rodriguez. Pak and Education Minister Kim Yong-jin attended the reception.

 The Cuban delegation arrived in Pyongyang on Sept. 3.

North Korea's Top Military Chief Meets with Cuba's Armed Forces Chief
NTD Television June 1, 2013
North Korea's hardline military chief Kim Kyok-sik met with the Cuba's armed forces chief, General Leopoldo Cintas Frias, in Havana on Sunday (June 30).
The four-star general, in his 70s, has been in Cuba since Friday on an official visit to strengthen ties between the allies.
Kim Kyok-sik visited military installations and held talks with top Cuban government officials.
North Korea, along with Cuba, is one of the world's last communist countries. Over the past year, it has been ratcheting up pressure on neighbour South Korea. Relations have been strained with China and it threatened to bomb the United States.
In April, former Cuban leader Fidel Castro warned ally North Korea against war as tensions on the Korean Peninsula rose.

--- El ministro de Defensa de Cuba recibe a delegación militar de Corea del Norte

 30 de junio de 2013•EFE

El ministro de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) de Cuba, Leopoldo Cintra Frías, recibió hoy en La Habana a la delegación militar de Corea del Norte encabezada por el jefe del Estado Mayor General del Ejército Popular, Kim Kyok Sik, informó la televisión estatal.

El general de cuerpo de ejército cubano y la delegación norcoreana intercambiaron sobre temas de interés bilateral y destacaron el buen estado de las relaciones, según indicó el telediario.
En la reunión también estuvieron presentes jefes principales del ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas de la isla.
Durante su visita oficial a Cuba, el general Kim Kyok Sik resaltó los lazos de "hermandad" entre ambos países, y dijo que comparten "la misma trinchera".
La delegación norcoreana concluirá mañana lunes 1 de julio su estancia en Cuba, donde cumplió una agenda que incluyó recorridos por unidades militares de las FAR, entre ellas, la de tanques de "La Gloria Combativa Rescate de Sanguily", ubicada al oeste de La Habana, y sitios económicos, históricos y culturales.